CONFERENCE DES REGIONS PERIPHERIQUES MARITIMES
CONFERENCE OF PERIPHERAL MARITIME REGIONS

COMMISSION DES ILES
ISLANDS COMMISSION

6, rue Saint-Martin -35700 RENNES – F
Tel. + 33 (0)2 99 35 40 50 – Fax. + 33 (0)2 99 35 09 19
e.mail: jdh@crpm.org – web: http://www.commissiondesiles.org

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TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIFIC SITUATION OF THE ISLANDS IN THE STATE AID RULES

I - DEFINITION OF ISLAND REGIONS

Article 174 of the Treaty (formerly 158), which sets out the principle of "economic, social and territorial cohesion" of the EU, acknowledges the specific characteristics of certain territories with serious and permanent handicaps, including islands, and recommends that they be given *"special attention"*.

Article 175 of the Treaty specifies that the implementation of the internal market (and therefore Competition policy, which is one of its underpinning elements) should take into account the objectives set out in Article 174.

Historically, EU regional policy defined "Island Regions" as any territory totally surrounded by water, with no fixed link between it and the mainland and without the capital city of any Member State (excluding mainland Great Britain and Ireland).

This last point evolved after Malta and Cyprus joined the EU, in order to take into account the situation of these small island States. Declaration 33 of the Inter-Governmental Conference, annexed to the Lisbon Treaty therefore specifies that: *"The Conference considers that the reference in Article 158 to island regions can include island States in their entirety, subject to the necessary criteria being met."*

Similarly it is specified that the situation of the islands in general should be clearly distinguished from that of the Outermost Regions. Although all OMRs except Guyana are characterised by their insularity, this is only one of the features of their condition. The Treaty acknowledges this situation in Article 349, which provides a distinct legal basis for these territories; this being, among other things, to implement special provisions on State aid in their respect.

The present paper therefore refers to all EU island territories (including Malta and Cyprus) but does not address the special provisions on OMRs. Where these are concerned, we shall refer to the proposals put forward by the Conference of OMR Presidents.

As a reminder, the total population of EU islands stands at approximately 15 million (with 1.2 million for Malta and Cyprus). Out of this total, the Regions covered by article 349 represent over 4 million people.

II – WHY DO ISLAND TERRITORIES NEED TO BE GIVEN SPECIAL ATTENTION WITHIN THE EU AREA?

The difficulties islands encounter arise mainly from the interaction between two factors, their lower level of accessibility on account of them being isolated at sea, and secondly the various limitations imposed by their finite space.

- Islands are territories with fewer options than on the mainland. The prime example is transport. While European multimodal accessibility indicators are based on road, rail and air transport, the islands by definition are not accessible by car or train. Boats and planes are the only two options open to them… and even then, the smallest islands often have no aerodrome while the most remote islands rely essentially on planes for passenger transport.
- Island economies are characterised by their heavy reliance on a limited number of activities, added to which are problems related to seasonality for the dominant industries which are tourism, or in the case of some islands, fishing or agriculture. The most profitable activities are often subject to excessive exploitation (exclusively tourism-related) causing problems in terms of environmental, social and cultural vulnerability, etc., and the need for controlled and wherever possible diversified development.
- Islands are limited and remote markets, where competition is not always exercised in the same way as on the mainland (de facto monopolies, risk of abusing a dominant situation, etc.). Apart from certain niche markets generally related to exploiting a natural potential, local business are less competitive due largely to the absence of economies of scale.
- Human resources are often lacking in number or skills or fail to match market requirements (no qualified staff available for a business looking to expand, or no suitable jobs available for qualified staff seeking employment).
- Many islands have none of the natural resources needed to meet their water or energy needs, or indeed to satisfy certain bulk commodity supplies (fodder, building materials, etc.). These products or services need to be supplied or imported at great expense. The finite space of island territories can also mean that building land is scarce, and generate increased conflicts in use especially when a large part of the territory is subject to environmental protection measures. More generally with the exception of the bigger islands, these territories have little or no "hinterland" in the spatial and economic sense of the term. This limits the possible alternatives in crisis situations, making them even more vulnerable.

We will avoid dwelling on the negative side here: most islands do also have significant assets that can be exploited, such as their geographic location, their climate, the quality of their environment or the presence of certain natural resources in their vicinity. Nevertheless, in relation to a mainland territory with the same assets, islands will be faced with additional difficulties and will need to make special efforts in order to take advantage of their opportunities.

Similarly, we need to avoid making general assumptions. Each island is a case apart and its situation is distinct from that of even its nearest neighbour. However, it cannot be denied that size and geographic location are determining factors, since the smaller, more remote islands or archipelagos face much greater constraints than bigger, more closely-located and populated islands.

Nonetheless, even the bigger islands are not free from certain difficulties and deserve to be given differential treatment.

> *Although it is one of the EU's bigger islands, Sardinia (Pop. 1.6 million) is not exempt from problems frequently encountered in island markets. The island has no methane gas distribution network, and consumers have to use bottled gas (butane, propane). Although it does have a bottling plant on the island, Sardinia was subject for many years to prices 1.5 to 2 times higher than the mainland average. The reason? An unlawful agreement between the main distributors, which was eventually put to a stop by the judiciary and the arrival of new distributors. In this affair (which does not concern exclusively the island), it is above all the lack of alternative – i.e. access to the methane network – and the remote nature of the market that allowed anticompetitive practices to develop. (Source: Sardinia Region)*

III – WHAT IS STATE AID USED FOR?

a) To cater for additional transport costs

EU legislation[1] recognises the specific reliance of island territories on maritime transport and more generally, of the peripheries on air transport. It authorises various measures to be implemented (depending on circumstances: public service obligations, public service contracts, social aid for certain categories of passengers for island residents, etc.) in order to reduce the price of transport or maintain it at a socially acceptable level.

However useful and necessary they may be, do these mechanisms help to sufficiently reduce the cost of goods transport between the islands and the mainland or between islands themselves?

The reply is no, and this can be convincingly demonstrated by the fact that, even in islands benefitting from so-called "territorial continuity" policies (e.g. Corsica) or "Equivalent Road Tariff" (as in the case of the Scottish islands), mainland businesses continue to apply high extra costs to distribute their products, or even purely and simply refuse to deliver to these areas!

Various examples illustrate this point (see annex for details). In the UK, the M&S website displays a refusal message when you try to order furniture in the Hebrides; in France, for a simple drop-off, BHV applies tariffs that are 20% higher than the most expensive mainland areas and five times higher than Paris prices; sending a parcel between the mainland and Corsica by Chronopost costs up to 40% extra even though the usual delivery times cannot be guaranteed. Although it is just an indicative figure, cross-searching on Google the words *"delivery"* and *"except Corsica"* generates over 11,000 results. A similar search with the words *"Scottish Islands"* and *"Do not deliver"* generates over 1.5 million results!

Many big mainland-based distribution companies apply a practice of balancing out delivery costs throughout the national territory, or at least by large geographical areas. If these businesses refuse to deliver to the islands or apply to island customers higher delivery costs than the most remote mainland areas, then it is because substantial overcosts continue to apply to these destinations.

How can we explain this situation? Without claiming to be exhaustive, we will attempt to give some answers below.

Firstly, what characterises island links, apart from the sea crossing, is the imbalance in flows: 80 to 90% of traffic is in imports with only a marginal share in exports.

A business that delivers to an island therefore has to pay for the outbound <u>and</u> return journey of the haulier, whose vehicle will usually return empty and with no hope of loading a lorry stuck on a ship during a stopover. In contrast, the same haulier delivering between two big mainland city areas is able to load both ways, or in transit, and thereby spread the cost of the rotation and the profit margin between its different customers.

Next, deliveries in the islands often imply transhipments or stopovers in ports which are often risky (lost or damaged goods, theft, etc.). The premiums demanded by insurance companies are all the more costly.

Finally, deliveries to the islands require longer lead times (abovementioned transhipments, unforeseen weather conditions, etc.) that cost time and therefore money.

[1] Article 4 of Regulation (EC) 3577/92 for maritime transport and Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 for air transport.

We can imagine that a situation that leads many a mainland distributor to exclude islands from their equal pricing policy can only have an even stronger impact on island businesses.

- The huge majority of these are small and, more rarely, medium-sized businesses that can hardly practice economies of scale or negotiate the most advantageous contracts with transporters or insurance companies;
- The local market on which they rely is limited by the size of the island;
- These businesses are subject to higher transport costs both for incoming flows (when importing their input products) as well as outgoing flows (exporting finished products).

We can see therefore that the aid granted to ship or air carriers as part of their public service missions is not enough to put island industries on an equal footing with those based on the mainland.

In order to deal with this problem adequately, given the diversity of businesses and the very variable nature of transported products, it is probably necessary to introduce a system of direct aid for island businesses allowing – according to the wording in points 81 et seq. of the Guidelines on Regional National Aid – *"to compensate for the additional cost of transport, taking into account other schemes of assistance to transport"*. Such a possibility is only currently authorised by EU legislation in the case of sparsely populated Regions and Outermost Regions; the only option open to the islands is to apply *de minimis* rules, where the scope of application and intensity of aid are very limited for such use.

b) To cater for the lack of economies of scale

The lack or insufficiency of economies of scale affecting island businesses could be illustrated in many ways, but we will limit ourselves here – by way of several examples – to addressing certain difficulties that public authorities may encounter when trying to intervene to remedy this situation or limit its effects.

One of the possible responses to accessibility problems experienced by island industries is to develop in these territories activities aimed at processing endogenous resources or exporting higher value-added products that are less vulnerable to transport costs than raw materials.

Unfortunately, the restricted size of the islands and the limited or seasonal nature of some productions does not always make it possible ensure a sufficient volume of business for the processing plant to guarantee its viability. The economic advantage of processing is obvious for raw material producers, and therefore for the global economy of the island, but the economic profitability of the processing business in the strict sense of the term can be unpredictable and it may need public aid to make it sustainable. This is particularly the case in agricultural processing activities (dairy, abattoir, etc.).

EXAMPLE:
In the Scottish archipelagos where livestock farming is a relatively important traditional activity, live animals are often exported, resulting in lower added value and higher transport costs. Moreover, this influences the income of farmers since at fairs, buyers are in a dominant position, as there is not enough local pastureland to allow livestock to be kept too long if they are withdrawn from the market. Finally, livestock exports raise the question of welfare, with animals having to endure up to a 7-hour crossing in often difficult weather conditions (a problem that risks escalating if EU legislation in this area is stepped up). Local slaughter can solve these difficulties to a certain extent, but the volume of livestock handled, especially in bad years, is not enough to ensure the profitability of abattoirs, which require significant investments in order to comply with EU standards. This threatens the economic survival of these plants despite their utility. However, operating aid is unauthorised, and while the use of de minimis *aid is an option, it proves to be insufficient at its current level. (Source: Comhairle nan Eilean Siar, and Shetland Islands Council).*

Public intervention may also prove necessary when the access to endogenous or local resources is open to the market and local businesses do not have the means to purchase rights.

EXAMPLE:
One known example is in the archipelagos of northern Scotland, whose economy relies heavily on the fishing industry. The fishermen in these islands, who operate in fisheries for the most part subject to EU quotas, do not have the necessary financial means to purchase licences compared with big fishing companies based on the UK "mainland" or in other EU States, which have a much higher capital. The local authorities, aware of the context of dwindling fish stocks and wanting to ensure the sustainability of this traditional activity in their territory, intervened to purchase these quotas and make them available to the local fleet. They finally came up against opposition from the Commission, which considered that this form of support constituted State aid. (Source: Shetland Islands Council).

Note that these same local authorities seized the opportunity of developing the oil industry in the North Sea in the 1970's and 80's and through their active involvement had reaped substantial financial benefits that were invested into a reserve fund. It is a paradox that by wishing to see this capital invested into the local economy they have come up against EU legislation, while the European Union is constantly urging territories beset by geographical handicaps to "exploit their assets"

With regard to the maritime economy, these same islands report other difficulties in trying to take advantage of potential assets related to their geographic location:

EXAMPLE:
The Shetland archipelago (Pop. 27,000) which owing to its geographic location is a centre not only for fisheries, but also the Atlantic and North Sea oil industry, would gain in becoming a focal point for maritime activities by equipping itself with drydock facilities to meet the needs of its significant shipping traffic. Unfortunately, the amount of investments required, their low profitability rate and the high degree of risk discourage private capital. The regional authorities deem that such a development would be complementary to the various maritime activities, that it would have a driving effect on the local economy and would be a source of skilled jobs. They would be prepared to invest, but the current State aid rules do not allow them to intervene, and all drydock activities continue to be carried out several hundred kilometres away on the mainland. (Source: Shetland Islands Council).

We can therefore see that although the public authority conceives the interest of the facility in terms of overall economic repercussions, i.e. taking into account all the positive direct or indirect effects of such a development, it will not be easy for it to solicit private sources of capital, which shy away from a costly investment in a marginal and risky market.

IV – HOW CAN THE CURRENT SITUATION BE IMPROVED?

While island territories share a certain number of characteristics, islands are also undeniably distinguished by their extreme diversity. The examples above are for illustrative purposes only and reflect a given economic context and geographic framework: other islands of a different size or situated in other climates will have different economies and therefore distinct needs in terms of State aid.

What needs to be envisaged here is not a specific response to each case, but the drafting of a general framework – a "toolbox" that gives public authorities sufficient scope for action to intervene in island economies and contribute to their development.

> *EXAMPLE: REGULATION ON MARITIME CABOTAGE*
>
> *EU Regulation No 3577/92 on maritime cabotage presents an interesting example of a toolbox insofar as it addresses a complex issue in a very concise text. In a few lines (Article 4 et seq.), the Regulation recognises the specific nature of island cabotage, which needs to be treated as distinct from mainland cabotage, and offers public authorities a choice between several options (Public Service Obligations or Public Service Contracts). A number of documents (guidelines, interpretative Communication), have subsequently specified the conditions for application, allowing the legislation to be adapted and evolve over the years[2].*
>
> *Through EU Regulation No 3577/92 and the subsequent texts, as well as through the provisions on social aid granted to certain categories of passengers (including island residents), the islands have therefore been able to use a large range of instruments to manage the issue of maritime transport: PSO, PSC, social aid, etc. This has not resulted in a maximum level of interventionism. Although some islands have chosen to use one or more of these instruments, others have preferred to use none, while others have seen their choices change over time.*
>
> *Of course the provisions set out in the Regulation on Cabotage are not a panacea to the problem of transport, where additional costs stem various sources (cf. Supra) but the Regulation itself proposes a mechanism that could be used as a basis for inspiration.*

What should such a "toolbox" contain?

<u>It needs to include three elements</u>:

a) **Firstly, guarantee island public authorities a minimum capacity for intervention.** The large majority of island territories are already covered by the provisions (and therefore the limit and intensity of aid) laid down in various legislation: Article 349 of the Treaty (Outermost Regions), Article 170.3 a) ("Convergence" Regions), or for those meeting criteria under general law, the provisions set out in Article 170.3 c). This measure would therefore concern those islands that do not belong to any of the aforementioned categories, by making them automatically eligible under 107.3 c) – This is only the case at present for islands with a population of less than 5,000.

b) **Secondly, boost the capacity of island authorities to carry out targeted actions.** This is achievable by <u>substantially increasing the various thresholds of *de minimis* aid (general rules, agriculture, fisheries, road transport, etc.) in these territories.</u> Because *de minimis* aid is extremely flexible in the way it can be used, thereby allowing it to address very diverse situations, it seems to be one of the instruments best suited to meeting the needs of the islands, especially since the amount of funding required by island SMEs is generally proportional to their small size. As an example, an increase in the general ceiling for *de minimis* aid from €200,000 to €500,000 which was introduced temporarily between 2008 and 2010 could have been maintained in the case of the islands, without disturbing the EU internal market.

[2] Communication on the interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92, Brussels, 22/12/2003, COM(2003) 595 final ; Community Directives on State aid for maritime transport, 17/01/2004, Commission Communication C(2004) 43 (2004/C 13/03); Communication updating and amending the Communication on the interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92, Brussels, 11/05/2006, COM(2006) 196 final.

Furthermore, it would not be improper to apply differentiated ceilings to *de minimis* aid depending on the nature of the territories, based on the provisions set out in Article 174 of the Treaty – in other words by granting higher ceilings in territories with serious and permanent handicaps. Apart from the fact that this would limit the global economic impact that a uniform increase in ceilings would have throughout the Union, the application of a differential like this would help to create more equal opportunities between those industries having to cope with specific territorial constraints and others.

c) **Finally allow public authorities to apply to island businesses direct aid that is neither degressive nor time-limited, in order to compensate part of their additional transport costs.** This would allow island authorities to introduce a "targeted" development policy, corresponding to the characteristics and needs of the local industrial fabric. This measure would require a change in the provisions laid down in §81 of the Guidelines on regional national aid, which would be extended to include the islands.

A policy proposal needs to be added to these regulatory proposals.

Research on which this note has been based has shown that there is generally very little awareness or understanding of the system of State aid set up by the European Union. This is not something that is specific to the islands, but the small size and remoteness of island industries certainly results in even greater unawareness. While a multinational or even a big company can rely on a competent legal department, or even commission (and finance!) the assistance of consultancy firms specialised in competition policy, this is certainly not the case in islands where businesses are at best medium-sized and more generally small or very small.

Island businesses are therefore, in this regard, reliant on information provided by public authorities, mainly States. However, it is not sure whether national authorities always make the necessary effort to explain to island business communities all the existing possibilities for intervention authorised by EU legislation. Similarly, national legislation may delay in introducing provisions to the advantage of the islands, or some States may even deliberately ignore them and apply more restrictive measures.

EXAMPLE:
The provision designed to grant a 5% increase in the intensity of aid for investments in newly created small businesses when they are situated in islands with a population of less than 5,000 (as laid down in §89 of the Guidelines on Regional National Aid 2007-2013) seems to have been extensively overlooked or ignored. According to the Ponant Islands Association, this possibility was not mentioned during discussions on the regional aid map with the French government. In Greece, national legislation did not include this provision until May 2011… According to a study carried out by the Greek government on the situation of SMEs, business start-ups in the Greek islands have practically not benefited from any public aid. (Source: Ministry of the Economy of the Hellenic Republic).

It cannot be denied that a procedure designed to relax the system of aid applicable to the islands or to increase the intensity of certain types of aid will only have a limited impact if business people are unaware of these provisions. In contrast, poor knowledge of the rules in force or uncertainty as to how they are applied can result in conflicts with the Commission that could otherwise have been avoided (cf: example of aid in purchasing fishing licences in the Shetland Islands).

The European Commission must therefore play a pedagogic role in publicising and explaining not only the utility of the State aid system and how it works, but also the possibilities offered by EU legislation as well as the accepted levels of tolerance. The paradox is obviously that Competition services are aiming to reduce the amount of State aid within the EU rather than encourage businesses to make use of it, whether in the islands or elsewhere…

V – LIMITED RISK FOR THE EU

Can relaxing the rules on State aid for island territories, as suggested previously, cause serious disruption to the internal market?

- Let us first note that in order for there to be State aid, the State first needs to have the means to grant it. However, over 90% of the EU's island populations (excepting the OMRs) are from Mediterranean States most of which are experiencing a particularly difficult budget situation making any excess in public spending unlikely. Even if EU legislation was at its most liberal, it is doubtful that we would see a significant increase in the amount of aid.
- Regional national aid rules currently allow sparsely populated territories to be automatically eligible under Article 170.3c), authorising them to benefit from operating aid to cover additional transport costs. The proposals set out here consist simply in extending the scope of already existing derogations to cover island territories.
- Regarding eligibility under article 107.3c), we should recall that the EU island population not covered by either Article 349 of the Treaty (Outermost Regions) or Article 107.3a) (Convergence Regions) represents around 6 million people. About 3 million of these 6 million live in regions with a GDP/capita of between 75 and 90% of the EU average and in this respect should be included in the list of "intermediate regions" under regional policy. If we assume that these "intermediate regions" will be recognised as being eligible under Article 170.3c), this would leave a remaining 3 million island people.
- The automatic inclusion of all islands within the framework of Article 107.3c), as a minimum requirement, would only therefore actually concern 3 million people. This is a rather insignificant figure, representing only 0.6% of the EU population. In relation to the population covered by the "intermediate regions" category (i.e. 73 million people), this would only represent an increase of around 4%.
- Similarly a policy designed to substantially increase *de minimis* aid in the island Regions will only concern 15 million EU inhabitants, i.e. 3% of the EU population (2.22% if we exclude the OMRs).
- With regard to aid designed to cover additional transport costs, Articles 81 et seq. of the Guidelines set out very clear screening rules to avoid any form of over-compensation. It is hard to see how extending this provision to the islands could distort competition.

PROPORTIONALITY

Should the European Commission wish to introduce a graduated policy, by differentiating the authorised intensities or ceilings of aid in the islands on the basis of their population size, it would be possible to refer to a classification based on the demographic size of NUTS III island areas.

A NUTS III island area is defined as a NUTS III level statistical Region where the majority of the population lives on one or more islands without a fixed link with the mainland; the bigger islands are thus subdivided into several NUTS III island areas.

Categories may then be established ranging from the least populated islands (NUTS III < pop. 50,000) to the most populated islands (NUTS III > pop. 1,000,000)

As an example, and if we analyse the distribution of island populations not already covered by Article 349 or by Convergence policy (i.e. 6 million European citizens in total), we note that the least populated NUTS III island areas only constitute a small population in total.

Greater aid for the smaller islands – and therefore the most vulnerable given the limited size of their market – would therefore have only an insignificant impact at EU level.

Category	Population size of individual NUTS III "Island" areas (*)	EU population concerned by measure (*)
1	<50,000	312,504
2	50,000 to 100,000	412,324
3	100,000 to 250,000	2,077,763
4	250,000 to 1 million	3,189,761
5	>1 million	none

(*) Islands other than Outermost Regions and Convergence Regions.
Not including small inshore islands belonging to a mainland NUTS III area, which could be considered automatically under Category 1.

NOTE

The above proposals are set out in detail in the Technical Paper from the CPMR Islands Commission entitled "Addressing the issue of island territories in future cohesion policy".

ANNEXES:

1 – Screen captures illustrating additional costs applied by mainland businesses for deliveries to the islands or illustrating their refusal to deliver to these Regions. Examples taken in France (Corsica) and the UK (Scottish archipelagos), where there is nevertheless a "territorial continuity" policy in application in these islands.

2 – State aid and the Stornoway Abattoir. Note communicated by the Outer Hebrides Council (Comhairle nan Eilean Siar).

3 - State aid – the Shetland perspective. Note communicated by the Shetland Islands Council.



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

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

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Pochette gonflable 1 kg	19,65	23,50	18,67	22,33
Pochette gonflable 2 kg	20,90	25,00	19,85	23,75
Boîte 3 kg et boîte 3kg Chrono KDO	22,58	27,01	21,45	25,65
Boîte 6 kg	25,08	30,00	23,83	28,50

LES SERVICES D'AFFRANCHISSEMENT CHRONO 13®

Livraison de vos documents et marchandises déjà emballés le lendemain matin avant 13 h en France métropolitaine(1) et à Monaco.

Poids (jusqu'à)	€ HT	€ TTC
2 kg	28,03	33,52
5 kg	32,03	38,31
10 kg	39,29	46,99
15 kg	46,56	55,69
20 kg	53,81	64,36
25 kg	61,07	73,04
30 kg	68,34	81,73

Pour les envois du continent vers la Corse, supplément de 19,60 € HT (23,44 € TTC).

Le service Chrono 10® est disponible sur www.chronopost.fr


livraison "sauf la Corse"
Environ 11 100 résultats (0,25 secondes)
Recherche avancée
Tout
Images
Vidéos
Actualités
Shopping
Plus
Recherche sur le Web
Rechercher les pages en Français
Pages en langue étrangère traduites
Plus d'outils
Tarif chronopost France métropolitaine sauf la Corse
www.jeanpaulguy.fr/contents/fr/d810.html - En cache
CHRONOPOST livraison le lendemain avant 13H00. Accueil > Frais de port > Tarif chronopost France métropolitaine sauf la Corse. Tarif chronopost France ...
Pièces chaudières brûleurs chauffe-eau gaz fuel électrique
www.jeanpaulguy.fr/ - En cache
Commande avant 15H00, livraison le lendemain avant 13h00 sur la France sauf ...
Plus de résultats de jeanpaulguy.fr
Livraison - Batterie Mégastore
performancebatteries.fr/page/livraison/ - En cache
Livraison le lendemain dans toute la France continentale, sauf la Corse, Monaco et les iles du littoral, si la commande est passée avant 16H00; ...
Livraison - Majorie OneStroke
www.onestroke.fr/fr/content/1-livraison - En cache
Livraison en FRANCE (sauf la Corse): La livraison est effectuée par LA POSTE - colissimo suivi avec ou sans signature. Livraison en CORSE, en C.E.E. et à ...
[PDF] BON DE COMMANDE FOIE GRAS
www.lemuseeduvin.com/bon-de-commande-foie-vin.pdf
Format de fichier: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - Afficher
d'achat livré en France métropolitaine (sauf la Corse). Pour le reste, merci de nous contacter en appelant Le Musée du Vin ...


Scottish islands "do not deliver"
Environ 1 550 000 résultats (0,19 secondes)
Recherche avancée
ClassicAles - Delivery Information - [Traduire cette page]
www.classicales.co.uk/Delivery.aspx - En cache
In addition, our couriers do not deliver to PO Box numbers unless a valid ... Scottish Offshore Islands: HS, IV41-49, IV51, IV55-56, KA27-28, KW15-17, PA20, ...
Delivery and Returns - Glovers Stationery - [Traduire cette page]
www.gloverssupplies.co.uk/delivery - En cache
We do not deliver on Saturdays. We only deliver to Mainland UK. We do NOT deliver to the Scottish Islands, Isle of Man, Channel Islands or Isles of Scilly ...
FAQs - :: Total Office - Totally Possible :: - [Traduire cette page]
www.totaloffice.co.uk/Faqs.aspx - En cache
We do NOT deliver to the Scottish Islands, Isle of Man, Channel Islands or Isles of Scilly. We do NOT deliver to PO Box addresses. ...
FAQs - Anglo - Office Productivity - [Traduire cette page]
www.anglo-ltd.com/faq/ - En cache
We do not deliver to the Scottish Islands, Isle of Man, Channel Islands or Isles of Scilly. We do not deliver to PO Box addresses. ...
How much does delivery cost? - [Traduire cette page]
help.next.co.uk/Section.aspx?itemId=10303 - En cache
... Isle of Man, Channel Islands, Scottish Islands, Scilly Islands £35. Other offshore islands £35). With the exception of BFPO addresses we do not deliver ...
Comstat Office Supplies - Delivery & Returns - Office Supplies for ...
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**STATE AID AND THE STORNOWAY ABATTOIR,
ISLE OF LEWIS, WESTERN ISLES**

BACKGROUND

Until early in 2002 there was a very successful Abattoir operating in Stornoway in the Island of Lewis serving the needs of crofters in both Lewis and Harris who wished to have their livestock, predominantly sheep and cattle, slaughtered humanely in premises conforming to national health and safety guidelines along with veterinary supervision. Financial support was provided by the Local Council, Comhairle Nan Eilean Siar, to assist the Abattoir to meet its financial targets to ensure viability. The financial subsidy provided by the Council was relatively small and it was not considered to infringe State Aid Regulations. However, the situation changed in 2002 when the financial assistance provided by the Council was deemed to have breached State Aid Regulations and this financial support ceased.

CURRENT SITUATION

After much debate and deliberation the Abattoir service was redesigned to try and ensure that the service would continue with a largely reduced financial assistance from the Council and with a target of self-suffice being set. The result of the service redesign was that the Abattoir now only operates from August until January instead of providing an all year round service up until 2002.

- The Abattoir service aims to set a cost recovery budget for the period of operation of the Abattoir. The last period of operation (2010)returned an operating deficit of £12,836
- The operating period has now been constrained to mid-August to end December to control core operating costs to the period of greatest demand in order to maximise operating efficiency and minimise core costs which require to be recovered
- There is a demand for services outwith this period but the demand is sporadic. A recent trend of increasing demand from pig producers has not been sustained following the reduced period of opening. The annual usage rates have been in decline over a number of years with sheep numbers showing the greatest year on year percentage reduction with a drop of 1000 from 2009 to 2010.



- Increasing costs of utilities and waste disposal costs run well in excess of normal inflation and the charges levied in order to attain cost recovery is becoming such that many crofters are unwilling to pay higher charges and have decided to cease stock keeping or in some cases revert to unregulated home kill arrangements
- The Local authority determined to provide a limited seasonal service when there was no private sector interest in operating the Abattoir (without an operating subsidy)

- Were there to be the ability to offer limited subsidy, user charges could be reduced to incentivise greater use of the facility. This could promote an increase in the crofting sector stock keeping of sheep, cattle, and pigs and would provide greater self-sufficiency in food supplies within the islands.

STATE AID ISSUES ARISING FROM THE STORNOWAY ABATTOIR SERVICES CHANGES FROM 2002

- State Aids issue affect many aspects of the work of the Economic Development Service and most of the issues which arise are due to an individual organisation's interpretation of State Aids.
- The process for State Aids needs to be simplified. At present local issues require discussion with Scottish Government officials, UK Government officials, UK representative to the European Commission officials. At each stage some of the details of the proposal are lost through misunderstanding until what the Commission is considering bears little resemblance to what was initially proposed or the reasons for the initial request have been diluted. Clearer and more direct communication channels should be established between Commission officials and on the ground practitioners.
- The current State Aid regime precludes the development of innovative purpose designed solutions to local issues which have negligible or no impact from a European market perspective. There should be some degree of minimum economic area size to which State Aids apply with special exemptions for remote rural and peripheral areas. Should small Island areas, where local market services predominate be treated the same way under State Aids as major national Government industry subsidies? Is there a potential to undertake a pilot "Island derogation" from State Aids in order to boost economic activity.
- A prime example from the agricultural sector is the argument that the provision of a basic service industry like the Abattoir at Stornoway is a State Aid when in reality there is absolutely no competitive financial gain to the recipient being able to slaughter animals on the Island. A sheep carcass hanging on a meat hook in Stornoway (or Lerwick) is still facing the most expensive transport to mainland markets of any competitors produce anywhere in the EU. There is clearly no distortion of trade. The provision of basic infrastructure services on Islands in vulnerable areas should be exempt from State Aid Regulations if the loss of that service jeopardises the viability of the sector.

Alasdair Macleod
Gaelic & European Policy Officer
Comhairle nan Eilean Siar
29 June 2011

STATE AID – THE SHETLAND PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

This short paper has been prepared to provide examples of state aid restrictions that have had a detrimental impact on the development of traditional industries and related infrastructure in Shetland. It covers the provision of agriculture related services, fisheries development measures and uses the example of a dry dock development in a discussion on market failure.

AGRICULTURE RELATED SERVICES

Agriculture exists in a very fragile state in Shetland. Our 1800 holdings produce 90,000 sheep and 2000 cattle for sale annually. Of this total around 10,000 sheep and 100 cattle are slaughtered on the islands. The rest are exported as store animals for fattening on UK mainland units. All this means that providing basic related services such as Marts and Abattoirs are marginal activities. These services can only derive income from low numbers of stock. Commercial operations struggle to survive and continuity of service is only possible with some public support.

In 2007 complaint CP 149/2007 led to the Shetland Islands Council abandoning its plans to build a fully functional abattoir for the islands and providing general support for agriculture related services. Instead the Council offered grant assistance to a co-operative under the EU Temporary Framework measure so that a much lower specified abattoir could be built. There continues to be considerable doubt about how the future running costs of the new abattoir are to be met, given that the most optimistic sales the facility can achieve are around £250,000 a year. This figure is just above the break-even point. In any year when trade diminishes the running costs will be much higher than the sales.

Similarly, the existing Auction Marts, also a co-operative, can break even in good trading years but we know from our experience that the price of stock fluctuates annually and widely. Any surpluses from three good years can be wiped out in a single poor season. Two or three poor seasons leads to a level of losses that the service cannot sustain without some public support.

Shetland agriculture needs to have basic services in order to operate successfully. We suffer from the joint disadvantages of long distance from markets and low thresholds. Market failure is a common occurrence so the Council needs to have the flexibility to support the abattoir and the Auction Marts through leaner times. The loss of these facilities would mean a further decline in agricultural activity, which would impact on the rural economy and biodiversity. Land abandonment would increase if these facilities can't be supported when necessary.

SUPPORT FOR THE FISHERIES SECTOR

Shetland is the most fisheries dependent community in Scotland with one third of GDP, £250 million, derived from fishing related activities. Our fishing fleet is comprised of vessels that are owned by the crews that fish on them. Fishing is integrated into our way of life and always has been. People from Shetland were taking their living from the sea thousands of years ago and future generations need to have the same opportunities. Our community is only 22,000 in number and we inhabit one of the remotest places in the EU, 200 miles away by sea from the nearest main port in the UK. There are few alternative activities that we can develop to derive our living from on a sustainable basis. There is no hinterland that we can draw on and the threshold population is too low to develop manufacturing to any meaningful extent. We need to develop our fishing activities if our economy is to prosper.

During the 1980's and 1990's Shetland Islands Council had made a great deal of progress in providing fisheries infrastructure and other measures designed to develop our fisheries sector in a sustainable way. We encouraged new crews to replace people who were retiring from the industry and we were building up a bank of community owned fish quota to ensure that our fishing fleet could operate sustainably within the terms of the Common Fisheries Policy. This strategy was hit badly by complaints C 87/2001 and 168/A/2004, which led to severe restrictions being imposed on our assistance to the fisheries sector. The Council is not allowed to purchase fish quota to be held for the local fishing community to use. We can only lend money on commercial term to the vessels to buy additional fish quota. Most vessels are small businesses with only limited borrowing capacity so there are not many lending opportunities. Fish quota has become a tradable commodity, with large multinational companies buying and selling the right to fish. This unregulated approach is not good for supporting the fishing communities that depend on sustainable fishing stocks for their living. More flexibility needs to be introduced into the system to enable more local control of fishing interests. Some catching needs to be kept near to the fishing stocks to enable fisheries dependent communities to survive and to promote carbon reduction.

Changes in EU policy, market conditions etc impact more severely on island businesses that are remote from their markets. Developing the fisheries sector in remote places at times when external factors restrict investment is a difficult issue. For example, the current restriction on bank finance imposes a higher degree of penalty on small enterprises. In such circumstances the public authority for islands needs to have the ability to put measures in place to develop fisheries opportunities. While de minimus levels are useful, they do not go far enough to enable effective support. The question of market failure is discussed in more detail in the next paragraphs.

DEVELOPING INFRASTRUCTURE IN MARKET FAILURE CIRCUMSTANCES

Due to limited economic bases, heavy reliance on the public sector and key industries, and distance from main markets, remote island areas are much more likely to suffer from the effects of market failure than well-connected areas.

In terms of infrastructure development, such as the provision of a factory or industrial facility, the key element of market failure which can prevent sectoral growth is allocative efficiency, i.e. the failure of the private sector to efficiently allocate resources. This occurs when the private sector is unwilling or unable to invest in infrastructure, and when this failure impacts on the local economy.

There are three main kinds of market failure:

- Access to finance – lack of available funds at hand or failure to raise venture capital;
- Imperfect information or co-ordination problems – lack of data with which to judge investment decisions;
- Externalities – factors affecting consumers or producers not accounted for by market price.

EXAMPLE - DRYDOCK

An example of market failure in Shetland has emerged in the investigations into the provision of a large-scale vessel maintenance facility. Currently no drydock facility exists which can take vessels larger than the relatively small inter-island ferries. This means that the larger ferries, tugs and local fishing vessels have no repair facility locally and must travel to mainland UK for drydocking.

The provision of a larger facility would have clear economic and social benefits to Shetland as there would be an immediate local market for which the drydock would be preferable over other options due to the cost and time involved in travel. There is also a significant regional market in fisheries and oil-related vessels which could be attracted by a Shetland drydock. Such a facility would require significant manpower, increasing the availability of skilled jobs in Shetland.

However, due to the extremely high capital cost, lack of certainty around the vessel maintenance market and circumstances which led to the failure of previous large drydock operations, there is little or no likelihood of private sector interest in constructing such a facility. This meets the definition of a market failure in all three criteria mentioned above.

PUBLIC SECTOR INTERVENTION

In such circumstances, where there are clear benefits to a remote area in industrial facility investment, but a lack of private sector interest, it falls to the public sector to invest and shoulder the initial financial burden and risk in return for social, economic and reputational benefits.

If such investment decisions are not taken, remote areas run the risk of erosion of the local skills base and their position in industrial marketplaces. This exacerbates the effects of remoteness, such as population decline, lack of economic opportunities and ageing populations.

GENERAL POINTS

The conditions of market failure need to be better understood and defined for commercial activity on islands. Article 107 should apply here.

The EU needs to engage with the concept of holding pools of quota at community level in fisheries dependent islands.

Agricultural and Fisheries de minimus levels need to be brought into line with Industrial de minimus levels for islands.

A continuing flexible measure such as the Temporary Framework measure should be considered for application in EU islands.

Shetland Islands Council

Economic Development Unit

30.06.11